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Username Please enter your Username. Password Please enter your Password. Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution. You could not be signed in, please check and try again. Sign in with your library card Please enter your library card number. Show Summary Details Overview Pindaris. Captain Caulfield succeeded in attacking and partially destroying this group. Major Clarke also attacked the fugitives. The British Reaction Several complex factors contributed to the establishment of British control over India.
From one perspective the British achieved this by defeating other contenders. Of these the most outstanding rivals were the Mughals, the Afghans, Tipu Sultan, other European powers especially the French , the Marathas, and the Sikhs. The Pindaris never sought to rule in India. They nevertheless participated in the Maratha's final effort to share in the control of India. One of the main factors which contributed to the successful achievement of British paramountcy in the subcontinent was the decision and action taken to destroy the Pindaris.
As early as General Wellesley had written, "we run a great risk from the freebooter system. Several officials and observers favored a "forward" or aggressive British policy.
It found expression in several different forms. Eventually Government policy also reflected this same opinion. After the wars, which established the British in Madras and Bengal, a period of non-intervention in costly wars, and a feeling that Indian affairs would take care of themselves followed with Pitt's India Act of But he went beyond merely defeating the French bid for power ln India.
He defeated and allied other Indian states to the British. Reaction to the debts incurred by his wars, an unsuccessful campaign against Holkar, and the increasing danger of the French in Europe provided reason for Wellesley's recall.
From this time, though the British recognized that eventual paramountcy was necessary for a peaceful and prosperous trade and rule in India, they postponed dealing with the issue until Lord Hasting's Governor- generalship.
The rulers disbanded their forces and cavalry which joined the Pindari groups and made them more difficult to control. In Captain Sydenham, Resident at the Bhonsla court, presented one of the first thorough accounts of the Pindaris to the Government. He reported that "the incursions of these common enemies of peace and tranquility are so regular as the periodic returns of the monsoon. British writers presented four principal, related reasons why the Government should destroy the Pindaris.
First, the Government should replace the anarchy, which the Pindaris had created, with a regular and responsible government. The Pindaris were a symptom of the disease which would eventually engulf and destroy central India, if not checked.
Their attacks provided zamindars and ryots with reasons to falsely claim lower revenue payments. The villagers had convinced themselves as living under the protection of a power whose very name was a sufficient barrier of defense: the contrary has been proved to them; and on the report of danger they now fly to the hills, nullahs, and to the sea-shore, rather than rely on the protection of a power which has once proved inadequate to the task.
First, they encouraged the Maratha chiefs to destroy or control the Pindaris by themselves. Second, Lord Hastings promoted a policy of defense or containment. Their dual responsibility was to keep the Pindaris within their central Indian bases and destroy them as they returned from expeditions. The British felt both of these methods were never fully successful.
Consequently, they chose a policy of full-scale war. Lord Hastings is responsible for the conception and eventual execution of this policy. He had not always favored a policy of expansion and aggression in India, but upon his arrival in India in he began to advocate placing the British in a paramount position in India. The Court of Directors had strictly prohibited the Company in India "from engaging in plans of general confederacy, and offensive operations against the Pindaris either with a view to their utter extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger.
He formally presented this policy to the Council in Calcutta in but they rejected it. Lord Hastings continually received reports of Pindari destructiveness. I am strictly forbidden by the Court of Directors to undertake the suppression of the fiends who occasioned this heart rendering scene the self-destruction of Unioval , least I should provoke a war with the Marathas. In response to the raids during late in the northern Circars, they stated they could no longer refrain "from any system of offensive operations against the Pindaris Since M.
These treaties contained stipulations that the states would cooperate with the British against the Pindaris and would offer Pindari parties no refuge within their states.
In justifying this step, Lord Hastings claimed, "I have insisted on rendering the British government safe against the growth of any similar pest" like the Pindaris by binding states to Britain, which can crush such associations in their bud.
With few exceptions and changes, they were the basis for British power and control of these areas for the next years. Sindhia, whom the Pindaris had often acknowledged as their nominal leader, presented a special problem.
In recent years the British Government had regarded him with suspicion. Officials thought that of all the native powers, he was in the best position and had the means to control the Pindaris. He had kept Karim Khan in confinement for several years. After Karim Khan's release and his subsequent attempt to plunder Sindhia's territory, Sindhia had defeated him. Another time, when the Pindaris had raided British territory, he sent a force against them to control them.
But this force was unsuccessful. Either he could cooperate with the British against the Pindaris or be treated as an enemy. Meanwhile, the British troops had assembled for the campaign in the north. They were close enough to threaten Sindhia's territory. Sindhia signed the treaty in late October. Amir Khan, the Raja of Bhopal, several Rajput states, and others also concluded treaties with the British at this time. The British had completed "political arrangements" for the war.
Lord Hastings' plan for the war showed caution, foresight, and ingenuity. He proposed to destroy the Pindaris by surrounding them, driving them from their bases, and slowly closing the circle while preventing them from escaping.
He placed reserve troops to deal with any hostile acts, which the Maratha or native princes might attempt. The account, like others, concentrates on the movements of British troops with only a few references to the Pindaris. During October , British troops took positions to the north and south of central India in preparations for the war. The Bengal forces in the north consisted of four divisions. Ochterloney the Reserve Division near Delhi. Lord Hastings took the field as commander-in-chief over all the troops.
Four main phases distinguish the movements against the Pindaris, conveniently corresponding to the months of November, December, January, and February. During the last half of November, the British troops in the south crossed the Nerbudda River, occupied the bases of the Pindaris, and began pursuing them as they fled to the north.
The combined durrahs of Karim Khan and Wasil Muhammad along with their families and baggage headed for Gwalior. Chitu's durrah joined Holkar's forces in the meantime.
Malcolm, who was pursuing him, retreated to a safe position not daring to attack this combination. Major-General Keir at the same time proceeded toward these Divisions from Gujerat. In close pursuit of the Pindaris, they attacked them several times. First, a cavalry brigade from the Center Division cut off the Pindaris' communication and march to Sindhia at Gwalior. The Pindaris then headed toward the territory of the Raja of Kota.
For a short time they remained in this area but only after defeating some of the Raja's troops who were protecting his frontier. A light cavalry from Marshall's forces overtook the Pindaris, defeated a group of about 1,, and pursued the remaining 2, to the Prabati River. Donkin with the Right Division had marched to a position eight miles from Kota. He captured the baggage and families of Karim Khan's durrah, as they fled northward in his direction.
Though Karim Khan avoided contact with Donkin and Marshall's forcer, further south on the Prabati, Adams dispatched Clarke with some cavalry who routed a party of this group. Karim Khan then joined Holkar s forces to the west. During the last part of the month Donkin received word that Chitu's forces were near Kota.
During January the war reached the turning point. All Pindari parties eventually returned south near their bases, with the British in close pursuit. British forces surrounded them on all sides. Donkin moved west to prevent a northern escape. Adams was to the southeast, while Brown from the Center Division moved into a position east of Jawad. Keir and Grant proceeded north pursuing the Pindaris after Holkar's defeat.
As Grant occupied the area around Jawad, Keir prevented Chitu from circumventing the British forces to the west. Both Chitu and Karim Khan began moving south toward their bases at the Nerbudda. By the last part of January, Chitu had evaded British troops and proceeded to the ghats.
Heath at Hindia received information of his party. He pursued, attacked, and completely dispersed the group. Chitu fled to Bhopal, where he tried to reach an agreement with the British through the Nawab. The British rejected his plans as too extravagant. Returning to central India, Karim Khan's group split into three bodies, but the British troops still detected them.
Clarke's cavalry attacked one group around Gangraur, while Adams pursued the rest into the Bhopal area. In February most of the Pindari leaders surrendered to the British authorities. Namdar Khan gave himself up on February third, and Karim Khan surrendered to Malcolm on the fifteenth. Others gradually followed their example.
He participated in the events connected with Appa Sahib at Nagpur but eventually fled to the jungle, deserted by his followers. Near the end of February his body was brought to Malcolm.
He had been attacked and killed by a tiger. The enemy always fled. They never made a prolonged stand nor attacked British forces. The British succeeded in destroying the Pindaris only through continued pursuit and relying completely on the mobility of their cavalry forces. In this way they sometimes overtook the Pindaris groups and gradually reduced their numbers.
A few areas provided local support and refuge to the Pindaris, but these were only temporary until the British discovered them. During the campaign other significant events had occurred. At the end of the campaign in the British had suppressed the "predatory" powers of central India. The area was now free from the misery of plundering horsemen and anarchy.
Karim Khan's lands provided 16, rupees annually, while Kadir Bukhsh's lands yielded rupees. Ironically, in dacoits from Oudh attacked Kadir Bukhsh's house. They killed four of his people, wounded many, and took some of his property. The land had passed from rent-free to assessed land though the revenue was very low.
The descendants lived in pretentious opulence with the title of Nawab, which the Government refused to recognize. He found it difficult to trace them. Summary and Conclusions In reviewing Pindari history one is struck by several themes and problems. These provide an understanding of the development of the Pindaris, besides raising serious doubts about the accepted ideas of the nature of Pindari society and British policy toward them.
The Pindaris developed within a traditional Indian framework. Their history after during the Independent Period shows a continuity with their previous Muslim and Maratha Periods in spite of the transformation of circumstances surrounding them. During the last part of the seventeenth century, Muslim leaders were the first to employ the Pindaris. At that time the Pindaris served in conjunction with Muslim armies against the enemy in the Deccan.
During the eighteenth century the Marathas organized and recognized the Pindaris as part of their military system. The Maratha chiefs utilized them as an efficient and effective unit who destroyed the enemy's resources and demanded no payment except the wealth they plundered. As Maratha power declined and the British strengthened their position in India, the utility of the Pindaris became less apparent to Maratha chiefs.
The British irritation toward them increased. During this Independent Period, the Pindaris, nevertheless, developed along traditional patterns rather than inventing new methods in response to the changing situation. The Pindari chiefs settled their families and followers in these areas and forced payments of land revenue ln the usual Indian manner. Even with these moderating influences of land-holding and settling ln central India and though their nominal leaders no longer requested their participation in wars of consolidation or expansion, the Pindaris refused to relinquish their habit of planning luhburs and plundering.
With no clear distinction between enemy and ally, all areas became fair game. Eventually, the Pindaris selected the Nizam, the British, and sometimes the Bhonsla as "enemy" land.
They generally abstained from devastating the territories of their previous benefactors, Sindhia, Holkar, and the Peshwa. During the same time British policy toward the Pindaris also reveals a consistent development. Wellesley was the first to recognize that the British must destroy the Pindaris to attain control of India.
With his recall, the pendulum swung-in the opposite direction. For a period the British wished to refrain from extensive involvement with the Indian states.
As early as , however, one British observer near the scene of Pindari activity began to advocate a policy to deal with the Pindari menace. Slowly other Government officials sought this same policy. Lord Hastings was the first Governor-General in several years desirous and willing to commit British troops and resources to their destruction.
The cooperative treaties concluded with Indian states in central India, the military preparations, and the events of the war successfully hindered the achievements of Pindari and Maratha aspirations. These activities and events prevented the materialization of a coordinated effort against the British. Pindari groups fled before the enemy as the British continuously closed all avenues of necessary assistance or escape.
The end of the war and the establishment of British control meant a complete transformation of the situation in which the Pindaris had functioned for one and a half centuries. No power accepted their special abilities as legitimate or beneficial to their purposes. Accepted ideas about the Pindaris vary considerably from the above general presentation as well as to more specific aspects.
The traditional picture conceives the Pindaris as a group composed of the worst villains of society who suddenly arose after and increased their numbers rapidly. Their only desire was to plunder, rape, murder, and burn. In order to more completely understand this period, one must attempt to reconstruct both the "Pindari" and the "British" points of view.
He refused to rely on regular pay. Through destroying and plundering the enemy' B camps and resources, he earned his living and served his military commander. When weather or peaceful conditions prevented this occupation, his leaders provided areas in which he settled among the other inhabitants.
Every source indirectly indicates that at such times he obeyed prevalent customs of Indian society. If his income from his chief or creditors proved insufficient, he often earned his living through a variety of occupations. Popular acceptance and even support of the Pindari indicates that the Indians, as well as the Pindari himself, viewed his occupation as legitimate.
On luhburs the Pindari committed atrocities, plundered, and burned crops and villages from the conviction that he was acting in a warlike situation against an enemy.
Such a view of Pindari society dose not justify their destructiveness or atrocities. Rather, it demonstrates the role of the Pindari in Indian society in this period. Certainly, it partially destroys the myth that the Pindaris were full-time enemies of society whose only ambition and occupation was to plunder.
The Pindaris also did not cause widespread anarchy. The treaties of introduced a new period into central India. British forces patrolled Hyderabad and Poona and along Sindhia's frontier. Residents closely reviewed events at most of the Courts. Indian rulers remembered the defeats they had suffered from the British in the Second Maratha War.
They, therefore, acted cautiously to insure against arousing British disapproval and consequential complete defeat. Though British treaties successfully restricted the actions of Indian rulers, they failed to form treaties with the subordinate or secondary powers in central India. The Pindaris and Pathans seized the opportunity to extend their power. They proceeded in the traditional manner of bringing areas under control and receiving the ruler's recognition of their right to the revenue of these areas.
Pindari leaders, a generation earlier, had acquired lands through a similar process. Only a few writers, therefore, could include this traditional process of the transferal of power within a very broad definition of anarchy. One of the most difficult problems to assess is the accusation that the Pindaris were responsible for the destruction of much of India's productive capacity. Economic and social studies of this period and immediately after it support no such hypothesis. Even the exceptional Guntur-Caddapah raid during directly affected a small proportion of the villages and raised food prices for only a short time.
The historical sources for this period provide insufficient evidence that the numbers of the Pindaris increased significantly. The first estimate of the Pindaris in reported numbers as large as the estimates during the following decade. It is also possible that Pindari membership did not double from to Rather, such a speculation conveniently supported the British observer's desire to attract Government attention to an "increasing" menace.
As an understanding of Pindari society contributes to a more complete picture of India in the early nineteenth century society, so does the examination of British attitudes and ideas. British officials selected and emphasized only certain aspects of the Pindaris. They based their selectivity on the necessity to morally justify their actions. Their choice of words, exaggerations, and repetitions demonstrate this.
British writers viewed the Pindaris as enemies of society, pests, swarms of locusts, the lowest form of freebooters and banditti, a scourge and plague on the earth, fiends, and "masses of putrefaction in animal matter. They were convinced that the Pindaris were an unusual and inhuman forge. An such, the British had to deal with them through exceptional methods expressed by the terms -- suppress, extirpate, eliminate, or destroy. The British felt that they had a moral duty to terminate this evil and provide a peaceful life for the inhabitants.
Two incidents especially reflect this British attitude. During the period that the Court of Directors in London still withheld permission to suppress the Pindaris, they proposed that Lord Hastings might deal with the Pindaris by playing off one faction against another.
The words used in the response of the Governor-General reveals his attitude I am roused to the fear that we have been culpably deficient in pointing out to the author " ties at home, the brutal and atrocious qualities of those wretches.
Had we not failed to describe sufficiently the horror and execration in which the Pindaris are justly held, I am satisfied that nothing could have been more repugnant to the feelings of the Honourable Committee, than the notion that this Government should be soiled by a procedure which was to bear the colour of confidential intercourse of a common cause, with any of those gangs.
First, the destruction of the Pindaris constituted an essential ingredient in Lord Hastings' policy of paramountcy. Without this justification, the conclusion of the treaties, which also required the submission of Indian states to British power, would not have been possible.
Second, the British refused to accept the Pindaris as a regular power. The British refused to accept these terms. Evidently Amir Khan was exempt from British wrath because he and his cavalry had devastated and committed atrocities in Rajputana instead of in British territories. The British denied the Pindari leaders any terms short of "unconditional surrender," though the Pindaris proposed them. It is clear that any thorough appraisal of Pindari history results in the revision of the traditional view.
In the future, examinations of the Pindaris might produce four views. Each would emphasize certain aspects and present an oversimplified and unbalanced account. They can be characterized as Imperialistic, Romantic, Marxist, and Nationalistic. The Imperialistic view would be a restatement of the traditional view. It proposes that the British Government in India brought peace, prosperity and civilization to an area devastated by uncontrolled hordes of robbers and ruled by incompetent princes.
A Romantic approach would utilize the Pindari in a similar way that United States television writers have thoroughly exploited the heroes of the West. This view would emphasize the carefree and rugged Pindari life. It would present him as the embodiment of a skillful, daring, courageous, and adventurous horseman. Riding swiftly across the Deccan plain on his trusty horse, his spear protruding upright, he would surprise and plunder British villages.
The British sought to acquire this area of India, not to provide raw materials or markets for British goods, but as a moral duty and for strategic purposes to unite the intermediate area between their three Presidencies. Lord Hastings' economic reasons hardly correspond to a possible Marxist ideology. Before a court of inquiry he stated that it was less expensive to destroy Pindari power in one campaign than to maintain British defensive troops and permit the yearly devastation of British territories.
Indian Nationalists can view this period with more optimism. They could present the Pindari as the last heterogeneous group, before the Mutiny, who resisted the expanding alien rule of Britain. Historical events, however, hardly substantiate this view. The Pindaris increasingly became more independent after as the British forced Maratha states to bind themselves to the British Government.
In this situation the Pindaris eventually selected to devastate the territories of the "enemy," Britain and their close ally, the Nizam.
Before the War, the Peshwa, Bhonsla, Sindhia, Holkar and the Pindaris sought to coordinate a plan to resist the British invasion. Sources provide no specific details about Pindari intentions through this alliance. A Nationalist could deduce that the Pindaris recognized the British as their enemies and actively subscribed to a plan to resist them.
Evidence, however, indicates another possible motive, a materialistic one. Pindari groups primarily plundered British territories for their wealth and prosperity. They would have raided other areas if they were equally prosperous. Before the War the Raja of Berar formalized arrangements with Chitu which offered him 5, rupees to cooperate with his troops against the British. Writers often compared the Pindaris with other groups. The suggested similarities were often superficial or even falsely based.
For instance, the identification of the Pindaris with the Taureq rested solely on the false proposition that both were primarily nomadic. In spite of these drawbacks, however, other comparisons contribute to the consideration of the Pindaris outside the Anglo-Indian context, thus extending the perspective of their study.
This paper briefly considers two specific cases and one general framework. These are the Cossacks, the Buccaneers, and guerrilla-type warfare. Areas became identified with their name because they not only controlled them, but settled on them as the majority of the population.
They resembled the Pindaris more in military customs than social culture, and during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than the subsequent centuries. The Cossack cavalry consisted of irregular, undisciplined, but highly skillful, rugged, and courageous horsemen. They learned to travel light, far and fast through rough, and often unfamiliar, terrain.
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Russian and Polish rulers employed the Cossack to defend their frontiers against Tartar attacks. Later the Cossack prominently contributed to the extension of the Russian frontier eastward into Siberia. Eventually he became a distinguished part of the Russian military system. Both the Pindaris and the Cossacks were famed for their lawlessness in enemy territory but peacefulness at home.
Yet while the Pindaris conformed to the society in which his family lived, the Cossacks created their own society. Though usually uneducated, they adhered fervently to an orthodox Christian faith which added zeal to the occasional lacerative attacks on "barbarian" Tartar lands.
The more than four centuries of Cossack history contrasts sharply to the two centuries of Pindari history ln their social and religious customs, their continued utility to the Russian state, and their eventual adaptation and partial incorporation to the changing situation around them. The striking similarities to the Pindaris of fighting habits, skills, and lawlessness existed for only a limited time and to a restricted degree.
In spite of the separation ln geographical location and difference of terrain, the Buccaneers of the West Indies resemble the Cossacks. They also maintained the vestiges of their religion. Though almost all Europeans, they were originally fugitives from the restrictions of established society, the economic and political outcasts of several nations.
For many years they harassed a common enemy, the Spaniards, and protected and enriched infant colonies. The British and French governors employed them since they lacked the funds for regular military forces.
In payment, the Buccaneers kept the plunder they obtained. He was a brave, cruel, tough seaman, and an excellent navigator. Both the Buccaneers and Pindaris were infamous to their enemies and useful to their allies because of their ability to destroy. The Buccaneer raids on Puerto Bello and Panama are especially noted for the pillage, torture, and devastation they caused.
The Buccaneer also secured no victories. Instead, regular naval squadrons comparable to regular Maratha armies achieved these. Unlike the Pindari, however, the Buccaneer attacked strongholds and fought formal enemy forces. Even so, these strongholds always promised a sizable loot, and the Buccaneers refused to waste effort on less prosperous prospects. By the end of the century the Buccaneer bands disappeared from the Caribbean. Only the prolonged efforts of governors, such as Morgan himself once a buccaneer and du Casse, the desire for more regular trade, and the settlement of Buccaneers on plantations produced this result.
As the Cossacks, the Buccaneers adapted to a changing situation and escaped the fate of a war directed against them. For modern experts of military strategy and world affairs, guerrilla warfare is a controversial, contemporary, and crucial problem.
The groups desire to achieve some political goal through their activities of harassing, raiding, capturing, destroying, or redirecting the enemy's forces and supplies. A guerrilla movement requires at least passive popular support and a difficult terrain to provide supplies, intelligence, recuperation, and security.
It is a transitory phase and self-defeating in that its intended result is successful withdrawal of the enemy and the establishment of a government. Pindari activities conform to several aspects of this definition, while contradictions and deviations preclude its inclusion within the total framework. At greatest variance are the aspects of a definite political goal, popular support, and activity behind enemy lines in conjunction with a war and allied troops.
The Pindaris, as already mentioned, articulated no political goal. Rather, they appear primarily motivated by the desire to plunder, though still willing to raid areas which their leaders and the Marathas defined as enemy territory. The populace often supported the Pindaris but usually under duress through the threat of violence or reprisals. During the Pindari War, the reluctance of inhabitants to provide intelligence about Pindari movements often prevented British troops from continuing their pursuit of Pindari bands.
Maratha leaders admired the Pindari methods of fighting and often promised them asylum and protection. The Pindaris did not restrict their activity to behind or on enemy lines. Factionalism among themselves and the Maratha leaders provided ample opportunity for plundering within "allied" territory. During the Independent Period they also operated during a time of peace, and independent of allied troops.
Their activities with the Marathas on campaigns into Hindustan and the Deccan during the eighteenth century and the plan to co-ordinate their efforts with the Marathas in the Pindari War indicate that, within the total context of Pindari history, independent luhburs were the exception rather than the rule.
Despite the aims of the Pindaris, their irregular method of warfare closely resembled guerrilla tactics. They were mobile, small units operating in a rugged terrain. They surprised the enemy, destroyed his resources and escaped through country in which pursuit was difficult. They avoided conventional engagements with enemy forces. As Indians who knew the language and culture and were familiar with the area, they had an advantage over the alien white officers. The Pindari weapons of the lance and the sword were not the most modern but, nevertheless, they were effective and required little maintenance and no ammunition.
Without the usual military training, organization or discipline, they were a quasi-military group. They ultimately depended, as did any guerrilla movement, on the outside support of a regular military system. Once the enemy controlled that, all the other guerrilla type practices of the Pindaris were ineffectual. Originating during transitional periods, the diverse members of these societies gradually developed distinct social, political, economic, and military customs.
Ruling states, within which these societies occupied subordinate positions, sought to restrain their military activities by channeling them against the enemy.
The result benefited both the rulers and the irregular forces. Because of the lack of funds and resources, or because of binding peace treaties, the governments employed the irregular groups to destroy and harass the enemy or to defend certain areas. Many of the tactics, which these groups used, resembled guerrilla-type warfare. In return for their activities, the groups obtained privileged concessions from the governments, especially the right to plundered goods and the assurance of restricted governmental interference in the groups t affairs.
Eventually, circumstances changed so that governments sought more peaceful conditions and stricter control over these groups and areas. The destructive activities of these groups threatened such developments. The French bought off Buccaneer leaders. The British outlawed Buccaneer activities and offered attractive alternative occupations, such as owning plantations. The Russians incorporated the Cossacks within their military system.
The proportion and esteem of the Gurkhas and the Sikh both of whom at one time fought against British expansion exemplifies such a possibility. Only Lord Hastings' contempt for the Pindaris and the convenience of concluding treaties and waging a war against them to establish British paramountcy in India excluded a more peaceful alternative.
Most significantly, a comparative examination of the Pindaris, Cossacks, Buccaneers, and guerrilla warfare contributes to a more objective interpretation of the Pindaris. The Pindari atrocities, their tortures, their mundane desire for plunder, their irregular methods -- none of these are the exclusive characteristics of the Pindaris.
An enduring assessment of the Pindaris in Indian history cannot be content with an overemphasis of the "immoral" actions of the Pindaris during luhburs or exaggeration of their threat to the peace and prosperity of India. Such treatment considers only the military and moral aspects at the expense of the social, political, and economic.
A thorough study of the Pindaris reflects many things. In part, it reveals the dynamic situation which the war and treaties of caused. The defeated rulers signed restrictive treaties, while semi-independent and subordinate groups increased their base and strength of power. This transformation occurred within a traditional pattern.
As such it had little disruptive effects on the population. Pindari history finally reflects the inflexible British attitudes during this period. However incorrect British ideas were about Pindari society, their selection, emphasis, and propagation of the most destructive aspects conveniently provided the necessary support to Lord Hastings' policy of British paramountcy in India.
See also. III, p. Each of these etymologies can be found in Henry Yule and A. Louis Renou, Hinduism New York: , p. The Pandhari region is mentioned in a poem by the great Maharastrian poet, Tukaram I have looked up as far as possible the quotes Sen takes from Kautilya and Bindasara and find no such exact words.
There is mention of the engagement of wild tribes for war in R. Shamasastry's Kautilya's Arthasastra Mysore, , p. Either S. Sen has taken his quotes from a different page or translation or he has misquoted and misled. Using the same translation and source for Brihaspati as S. Sen quotes from, there is no such quote on the page. There has also only been one edition of this source. Thus, the only possible reason for including such a conJecture is that Kautilya does mention the use of wild tribes similarly to the Pindaris and the possibility that I have just not been able to locate the proper sources.
Scott, Firishta's History of the Deccan London: , vol. II, p. Yet this- is under the general heading of the year Malcolm's Central India I, p. Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor London: , vol. Irvine, the translator, raises the question whether this is really a reference to the Pindaris or simply to the Bidaris, a completely different group.
Sen Military System , p. Malcolm, Central India , I, p. And Sen, Military System , p. And Yule and Burnell, Hobson-Jobson , p. Sen, Military System , p. XI, p. And H. Sandeman, Selections from Calcutta Gazettees Calcutta: , vol. A writer in the Selections reported that one luhbur increased from to 5, or ten times its original size.
Compiled from: Fitzclarence's Journal , p. This total of the income includes only Hiro and Barun and not other Pindaris at the time. George A. Says four annas a day to each Pindari was the usual price paid for not plundering.
Henry T. Malcolm, Central India , II, p. Smith, Oxford History of India London: , p. Jenkins' report flats the various durrahs under the Shahis and shows that they are sometimes mixed. And Gr. Both give an account of the argument between Hiro and Barun. Prinsep, Narrative , p. Sinha, ed. As a society, the Pindaris did not exhibit any striking irregularities from other groups in this respect.
They probably produced an equal number of males as females, did not practice polyandry, or female infanticide. There is nothing to suggest that Pindaris married many non-Pindari women or that there was a shortage of Pindari women.
Malcolm is discouragingly vague; he does not even mention one of these various tribes so as to clarify if he really means tribes or castes, or Just people from a certain part of India.
Only once does he mention caste in connection with the Pindaris after they are defeated. This is the low caste, Ladul, grass- and fire- bringers, with whom some Pindaris rejoined, p. This, however, is only a conjecture as is their numbers. Grant, C. Gazetteer , p. Sinh, Malwa in Transition Bombay: , p. Sinh is one that confuses and places Amir Khan as a Pindari.
And Ross, Hastings, p. Ross, Hastings , p. Fitzclarence, Journal , p. Both list places where the Pindaris held land in central India ln detail. Such a figure as 20, is based on the high estimate of 3, killed in the war and the 2, settled outside central India, and subtracting this from 25, Even if a much lower number is accepted, such as 10, instead of 20,, it is still difficult to account for the absorption and disappearance of this number except with such a theory as suggested here.
Additional circumstances support such a statement. The 25, Pindaris formed only a small portion of the population in a widely dispersed area where they lived. Owning horses, they could fulfill the demand for the transportation of materials and goods. Also, the largest recorded luhbur consisted of 5, men. If one permits an additional 5, men participating in other luhburs at the same time, the total remaining is 15, Luhburs also lasted for only a few months at the most.
This means that during a year about 15, Pindaris remained ln central India for the whole year, while all of the Pindaris lived in central India for six to nine months of the year. Malcolm was also amazed at the prosperity and orderliness of Sutwas, one of the main Pindari headquarters. Though reports outside central India indicate the destruction the Pindaris caused there, they evidently maintained order and contributed to the economy Or the places they lived.
Sandeman, Calcutta Gazettes , p. Also, see footnote number 15 of this paper. And Prinsep, Narrative , p. Sinha, Nagpur , III, p. This repudiates a notion held by F. It is possible that women were along during the Maratha Period of Pindari history, when the Pindaris had no permanent homes and were attached to an army. The women probably went along with tents and baggage and stayed with the army while the Pindaris went out raiding, but in the Independent Period women could not have accompanied the luhburs which went so fast because they traveled so lightly.
Malcolm in Central India , II, p. In a footnote he tells of the god which women invoked while their husbands were away on expeditions, while in the following sentences he says the women were hardy and masculine from accompanying their husbands on excursions.
Wither excursions and expeditions mean two different things or only one of these contradictory statements is true. From all other descriptions of the luhburs, there id no mention of Pindari women on luhburs. Sitaram, From Sepoy to Subadar Lahore: , p. This soldier also complains of the lack of information for the British in the Pindari war.
While he was staying with a fakir, some Pindaris came and asked the fakir freely about where the British or other Pindaris were. East India Company, Papers, p. And Malcolm, Central India , I, p. East India Company, Papers , p. Sydenham mentions Gr. Sitaram, Sepoy , p. Ross dated March 24, tells of 60 bullocks laden with booty.
Ross's letter. But Prinsep says they were of Karim Khan's durrah, Narrative , p. Reports in the Parliamentary Papers at this time seem to indicate that the Raja had only the alternatives of permitting his area to be plundered or letting the Pindaris through and, therefore, that he cannot be blamed.
Dalzell, dated March 15, Dalzell's letter, dated March 18, Mehta, Hastings , p. Spottiswoode, dated January 6, Wellesley is quoted in R. This general background is taken from V.
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