Along with the designations came stepped up U. There were several reported "near misses," according to press reports. F mortally wounded him. A related group is Ansar al-Sunna, an offshoot of the Zarqawi network that was operating in northern Iraq, including the Kurdish areas and areas of Arab Iraq around Mosul.
Ansar al-Sunna changed its name back to Ansar al-Islam in November ; however, the group has always maintained some distance from AQ-I. In its most significant attack, the group claimed responsibility for February 1, , twin suicide attacks in Irbil, northern Iraq, which killed over Kurds, including some senior Kurdish officials.
Before his death, Zarqawi had largely set AQ-I's strategy as an effort to provoke all out civil war between the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and the formerly pre-eminent Sunni Arabs. In this strategy, Zarqawi apparently calculated that provoking civil war could, at the very least, undermine Shiite efforts to consolidate their political control of post-Saddam Iraq.
If fully successful, the strategy could compel U. The strategy might have been controversial among Al Qaeda circles, as evidenced by a purported letter if genuine from the number two Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to Zarqawi, in July In that letter, Zawahiri questioned Zarqawi's strategy in Iraq by arguing that committing violence against Shiite civilians and religious establishments would undermine the support of the Iraqi people for AQ-I and the Sunni "resistance" more broadly.
To implement its strategy, AQ-I under Zarqawi focused primarily on spectacular suicide bombings intended to cause mass Shiite casualties or to destroy sites sacred to Shiites. Several suicide bombings were conducted in against Shiite celebrations, causing mass casualties.
The attack largely destroyed the golden dome of the mosque. It touched off widespread Shiite reprisals against Sunnis nationwide and is widely considered to have started the "civil war" that raged from the time of the bombing until late , when it began to abate. On several occasions, President Bush has said that Zarqawi largely succeeded in his strategy, although he and other senior Administration officials did not, even at the height of the violence in late , characterize the Iraq as in a state of "civil war.
By the end of and in early , most senior U. On July 12, , US. Some U. In January , President Bush articulated a new counter-insurgency strategy developed by Gen. Petraeus and others, based on assessments within the Administration and outside, that U. The deterioration in the previous U. The cornerstone of the new strategy was to increase the number of U. The Zarqawi strategy of attempting to provoke civil war, and some of its ideology and practices in the Sunni areas, were not universally popular among Iraq's Sunnis, even among some Sunni insurgent groups.
Strategically, Iraqi Sunnis have discernible political goals in Iraq, and some AQ-I tactics, such as attacks on Shiite civilians, were perceived as preventing future power sharing compromise with the Shiites. AQ-I fighters have broader goals, such as defeating the United States and establishing a Sunni-led Islamic state in Iraq that could expand throughout the region.
Iraqi Sunni insurgents believed that attacks should be confined to "combatant" targets—Iraqi government forces, most of which are Shiite, Iraqi government representatives, and U. Other Iraqi Sunnis resented AQ-I practices in the regions where AQ-I fighters congregated, including reported enforcement of strict Islamic law, segregation by sex, forcing males to wear beards, and banning all alcohol sales and consumption.
In some cases, according to a variety of press reports, AQ-I fighters killed Iraqi Sunnis who violated these strictures. Other Sunnis, particularly tribal leaders involved in trade and commerce, believed that the constant fighting provoked by AQ-I was depriving Iraqi Sunnis of their livelihoods. Others believe that the strains between AQ-I and Iraqi Sunni insurgent fighters were a competition for power and control over the insurgency.
According to this view, Iraqi Sunni leaders no more wanted to be dominated by foreign Sunnis than they did by Iraqi Shiites or U. During these strains were mostly muted as Iraqi Sunnis cooperated with AQ-I toward the broader goal of overturning the Shiite-dominated, U. Still, U. Meanwhile, Zarqawi was attempting to counter the strains developing between AQ-I and Iraqi Sunni political and insurgent structures. Forming the Shura Council appeared to many to be an attempt by AQ-I to demonstrate that it was working cooperatively with its Iraqi Sunni hosts and not seeking their subordination.
To further this impression, in April , the Council announced that an Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid aka Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, had been appointed its leader, although there were doubts as to Baghdadi's true identity.
In July , a captured AQ-I operative said Baghdadi does not exist at all, but was a propaganda tool to disguise AQ-I's large role in the insurgency.
The shift to increased integration with Iraqi Sunni insurgents continued after Zarqawi's demise. According to the State Department terrorism report for , al-Masri "continued [Zarqawi's] strategy of targeting Coalition forces and Shi'a civilians in an attempt to foment sectarian strife.
In April , the ISI named a "cabinet" consisting of a minister of war al-Masri , the head of the cabinet al-Baghdadi , and seven other "ministers. The AQ-I efforts to improve cooperation with the Iraqi insurgents did not satisfy the entire Sunni community, even though that community remained resentful of the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and its perceived monopoly on power. In August , U. This became known as the "Awakening" As Sahawa.
Rishawi's brother Shaykh Ahmad al-Rishawi later took over the group and, along with the governor Mamoun Rashid al-Awani and other tribal figures from Anbar, visited Washington D. Marines in Anbar Province. This additional force apparently emboldened the Anbar Salvation Council to continue recruiting Sunni volunteers to secure the province and purportedly convinced Anbar residents to increase their cooperation with U. To retain the loyalty of the Sons of Iraq, U. However, the Shiite-dominated Maliki government fears that the Sunni fighters are trying to burrow into the ISF with the intent of regaining power in Iraq, and have only agreed to accept about 35, Sons of Iraq fighters onto the ISF payrolls, not all of which are Sunni.
Some Sons of Iraq have already abandoned their positions out of frustration, particularly in Diyala Province, although they have not necessarily resumed insurgent activity. By June , at the height of the U. He and other commanders reported an ability to walk incident free, although with security, in downtown Ramadi, a city that had been a major battleground only months earlier and which U.
General Petraeus testified in April that he estimates that Anbar Province could be turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control by July , although the handover has been delayed by a power struggle between the Awakening tribal figures and the more urban, established Iraqi Sunni parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Party IIP.
In May , a Diyala Salvation Council was formed in Diyala Province of tribal leaders who wanted to stabilize that restive province. In early , Amiriyah was highly violent, but was stabilized by the emergence of former Sunni insurgents now cooperating with U.
In Baghdad, the U. Prime Minister Maliki said on February 16, that AQ-I had been largely driven out of Baghdad, and assessment that has not been subsequently contradicted by U. Petraeus attempted to increase the momentum of the Awakening Movement and the Sons of Iraq program with extensive U. The large scale operations included those related to the troop surge in Baghdad, and two other large operations—Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike.
Operation Phantom Thunder June , was intended to clear AQ-I sanctuaries in the "belts" of towns and villages within a 30 mile radius around Baghdad. Part of the operation reportedly involved surrounded Baquba, the capital city of Diyala Province, to prevent the escape of AQ-I from the U. General Petraeus appeared before four Committees of Congress during April , to discuss progress in Iraq.
On August 10, , Gen. James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, told journalists that AQ-I had permanently lost its foothold in large parts of Iraq, that it is no longer welcomed by Sunni populations in Iraq, and theat AQ-I fighters had begun to shift their focus to Afghanistan where their efforts against the United States might be more effective.
On the other hand, General Petraeus testified and has said in other settings that AQ-I remains highly active in and around Mosul, and views Mosul as key to its survival in Iraq, because it is astride the entry routes from Syria.
He testified that AQ-I is "still capable of lethal attacks" and that the United States must "maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it. While Al Qaeda leaders likely see the declining effectiveness of AQ-I as a vulnerability to their global recruiting and fundraising efforts, they likely continue to see the fight in Iraq as important to their battle with the United States.
Unfortunately, his poor grades prevented him from doing so, and he became more deeply involved in political matters. In , he participated in a non-successful coup attempt against the monarchy of King Faisal II. In , he joined the Baath party, a radical nationalist movement. In , a non-Baathist group of army officers succeeded in overthrowing the King.
The group was led by General Abdul Qassim. In , Saddam and a group of Baathist supporters attempted to assassinate Gen. Qassim by a day-light machine-gun attack. The attack was unsuccessful, but it helped to place Hussein in a leadership position in the Baathist movement and furthered the process of nationalist political indoctrination. After the attack, in which Hussein is slightly wounded, he fled to Syria. From Syria, he went to Cairo, Egypt where he would spend the next four 4 years. While receiving aid from Egypt, he finished high school at the age of twenty-four and continued his political education.
While in Egypt, he was arrested on at least two occasions for threatening a fellow student and chasing another down the street with a knife, both for political differences. In , he entered Cairo University School of Law, but did not finish his studies there.
In , a group of Baathist army officers tortured and assassinated General Qassim. This was done on Iraqi television. They also mutilated many of Qassim's devotees and showed their bodies in close up on the nightly news for more than one night.
Saddam, hearing the news, quickly rushed back to Iraq to become involved in the revolution. And involved, he was, as both an interrogator and torturer at the infamous "Palace of the End", in the basement of the former palace of King Faisal. According to reports by Hanna Batatu a government reporter , Hussein rose quickly through the ranks, due to his extreme efficiency as a torturer.
The Baathist party split in and Saddam had supported the "winner" in the latest party struggle. In , Hussein was jailed by some "rightist" military officers who opposed the Baathist takeover. Through other politicalinfluence provided by his older cousin, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, Hussein became deputy Secretary-General of the Baathists in In , Hussein escaped from prison and set up a Baathist internal party security system known as the Jihaz Haneen.
It was to serve as the continuation of his political and real rise to power in Iraq. In , another major upheaval in Iraq gave Hussein the greatest opportunity for further advancement; his mentor, Gen.
Bakr and the Baathist seized the government. Hussein was made Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, in charge of internal security. At the age of thirty-one 31 he had acquired what could have been deemed the number two spot in the Baathist party. He would continue in the position for approximately the next ten years. During that time, he would continue to consolidate his power by appointing numerous family members to positions of authority in the Iraqi government.
In his position of Deputy in Charge of Internal Security, he built an enormous security apparatus and had spies and informers everywhere in the circles of power in Iraq. During this time, Hussein also began to accumulate the wealth and position that he so relished as a poor sheep-herder in the desert of al-Auja. He and his family, now firmly entrenched in the infrastructure of the country , began to control the country's oil and other industrial enterprises.
With the help of his security network and several personal assassins, Hussein took control of many of the nation's leading businesses. President Bakr would lead the federation with Assad as second in command.
Hussein could not allow that to happen and began to urge the President to step down. Again with the help of his family and security apparatus, Hussein was able to accomplish his task. On July 16, , President Bakr resigned, officially due to health problems, but in reality a victim of Hussein's political in-fighting. Moving quickly to consolidate his power, he called a major Baathist meeting on July 22, During the meeting, various family members and other Hussein devotees urged that the party be "cleansed".
Hussein then read a list of names and asked that they step outside. Once there, they are taken into custody. A high-ranking member of the Revolutionary Command, the head of the labor unions, the leading Shiite member of the Command, and twenty 20 others are then systematically and personally killed by Hussein and his top party officials.
During the next few days, reports indicate that as many as other military officers, deputy prime ministers, and "non-party faithful" were rounded up and killed. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume 8. Perfect Allies?
The Case of Iraq and Al Qaeda. Bapat , Navin A. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Daniel Ertley. Chansonette Hall. Mark Lancaster. Cite Cite Navin A. Select Format Select format. In reviewing the diary I was intrigued by two notes. Blair was audibly taken aback.
Of course, there was none, which British intelligence knew. The meeting took place on the Truman Balcony. Vice President Richard Cheney and Rice were there as well. His questions to Bandar show his bias. Indeed their history was of being antagonists.
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